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Recent Developments 
Crane v. Scribner: 
Statutory Cap on Non-Damages Does Not Apply When Plaintiff's Last Asbestos 
Exposure was Before Statute's Effective Date 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held a statutory 
cap for non-economic damages 
does not apply when a plaintiff's last 
asbestos exposure was before the 
statute's effective date. Crane v. 
Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 800 A.2d 
727 (2001). The court further held 
such a plaintiff has the burden of 
proving the cause of action date 
occurred before the statute went 
into effect, which is ultimately a 
question of fact to be determined by 
a jury. Id at 369, 396-97, 800A.2d 
at 727, 742-44. 
While in the Navy, John 
Scribner ("Scribner") worked 
closely with Crane and Garlock 
gasket materials that contained 
asbestos. Upon discharge, Scribner 
worked for PEPCO until 1995 
when he was diagnosed with 
mesothelioma. Scribner underwent 
major surgeries but died from the 
disease a few months later. 
After Scribner's death, his wife 
and children brought a wrongful 
death action against the asbestos 
manufacturers who were found 
negligent and strictly liable in a jury 
trial. Defendants Crane and 
Garlock appealed to the court of 
special appeals, arguing the trial 
court erred in refusing to apply the 
cap to the survival action as a matter 
oflaw. The court of appeals granted 
certiorari. 
By: Farrah L. Arnold 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by examining three possible 
approaches for determining when a 
cause of action arises under section 
11-1 08(b)(1). Crane, 369 Md. at 
390, 800 A.2d at 739. The court 
first considered the "manifestation 
approach" set forth in Armstrong. 
In Armstrong, the court rejected the 
defendant's argument that a plain-
tiff's cause of action did not arise 
until the disease manifested itself. 
Id at 384, 800 A.2d at 735-36. 
The court noted while such an 
approach could be applied with 
simplicity and certainty, this ap-
proach was statutorily inconsistent 
because it disregarded the dis-
tinction between when a cause of 
action arises from when a cause of 
action accrues. Id at 390,800 A.2d 
at 740. However, the court did not 
expressly adopt an alternative 
method of determination, but merely 
ruled out the "manifestation ap-
proach." Id at 385, 800 A.2d at 
736. 
The court next considered the 
"exposure approach" which sug-
gested the cause of action occurred 
when a plaintiff first inhales asbes-
tos fibers that cause cellular changes 
leading to disease. Id. at 390, 800 
A.2d at 740. The court acknow-
ledged while it is difficult to pinpoint 
this exact moment, determination of 
the latency period of the disease can 
help detect when the disease was 
contracted. Crane, at 382, 800 
A.2d at 734. For instance, it can 
be determined that the first cancer 
cell developed in Scribner's body 
prior to July 1, 1986 by examining 
information such as his first and last 
exposures to asbestos, the total 
latency period ofthe disease, and 
the rate of his tumor growth. Id. 
The court noted that with hindsight, 
one may reasonably determine if a 
plaintiffhad the disease before the 
cap was in effect. Id. at 384-85, 
800 A.2d at 736. 
The third approach, or the 
"Grimshaw approach," looked to 
when the disease itself arose in the 
body. Id. at 390-91,800 A.2d at 
739-40. Grimshaw specifically 
recognized the cause of action 
occurred before the diagnosis or 
symptoms of mesothelioma arose, 
but refused to conclude the action 
arose at the time of exposure to 
asbestos. Id. at 385, 800 A.2d at 
736. The court stated this 
approach is difficult to apply 
because it evokes competing 
medical expert testimony to define 
the exact time of the action. Crane, 
369 Md. at 391,800 A.2d at 736. 
Moreover, this approach focused 
intently on when the first cell turned 
cancerous, which cannot be 
accuratelyas-certained. Id. 
Ofthese three approaches for 
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determining a cause of action, the 
court explained the "exposure 
approach" had the fewest significant 
problems and appeared most 
consistent with the statutory 
language. Id. at 390,800 A.2d at 
739. The court held ifthe plaintiff's 
last exposure to asbestos was 
undisputedly before the statute's 
effective date, then 11-108(b)(I) 
does not apply as a matter oflaw. 
Id. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742. The 
court further elucidated that cases 
where exposure occurred both 
before and after the statutory 
effective date will be left to the trier 
offact. Id. at 394, 800A.2d at 742. 
However, the court stated the 
burden is on the plaintiff to establish 
by sufficient evidence that his or her 
cause of action occurred prior to the 
cap's effective date. Crane, 369 
Md.at 395, 800A.2d at 742 (citing 
Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 
Md. App. 313, 322-31, 725 A.2d 
579, 583-88 (1999)). 
The court explained the 
"exposure approach" hinges on the 
notion that there was an injury, and 
thus a time of cause of action. Id. 
at 392,800 A.2d at 740. The court 
found the plaintiff's non-injurious 
exposures to the defendant's 
products were inconsequential to a 
determination of cause of action. Id. 
The court stated exactly when the 
injury came into existence cannot be 
reasonably ascertained through any 
reasonably reliable methodology, 
however it is certain that the greater 
the exposure, the greater the cellular 
damage. Id. at 392-93, 800 A.2d 
at 741. The court noted it is not yet 
possible to know which asbestos 
33.1 U. Bait L.F. 24 
fiber ultimately caused the cell 
division impenetrable to the body's 
defenses. Id. 
The Baltimore City trial 
believed a jury should not consider 
the issue of whether the cap should 
be applied, nor should it resolve 
when the plaintiff's cause of action 
arose. Crane, 369 Md. at 396, 
800A.2d 742-43. In Bauman, the 
court, after the jury returned its 
verdict, held a jury must resolve 
disputes over when the cause of 
action occurred. Id. at 396, 800 
A.2d at 743 (citing Owens-
Corning v. Bauman, 125 Md. 
App. 454, 726 A.2d 745 (1999)). 
Based upon this holding, the second 
jury was impaneled. Id. 
Disagreement over impaneling 
the second jury resulted because 
statute 11-1 08( d) suggested a jury 
may not be informed ofthe statutory 
limitation. Id. The Bauman court 
explained "not to reveal the cap to 
the jury did not remove from it the 
obligation to determine the factual 
question of when the plaintiff's 
cause of action arose .... " Id. 
Moreover, a jury has as its very 
function an obligation to be the trier 
of fact when there is a genuine 
dispute between parties. Crane, 
369 Md. at 396-97, 800 A.2d at 
743. The jury must, however, be 
supplied with ap-propriate 
instructions regarding what test or 
method must be used to arrive at a 
determination. Id. The court must 
then decide whether the statutory 
cap should be applied based upon 
the jury's determination. Id. 
The Defendants made case-
specific complaints because they 
believed Scribner failed to produce 
sufficient evidence that the cause of 
action arose prior to July 1, 1986. 
Id. at 397, 800A.2d at 743. They 
also argued impaneling the second 
jury on this issue was inappropriate 
because Scribner produced evid-
ence to the first jury that was 
inconsistent to the second time 
around. Id. Because the jury found 
the plaintiff had mesothelioma sub-
stantially caused by exposure to 
Defendants' products, the court 
stated these case-specific com-
plaints were without merit. Crane, 
369 Md. at 397,800 A.2d at 743. 
Crane v. Scribner elucidates 
section 11-1 08(b) regarding a 
personal injury cause of action 
sustained due to asbestos exposure. 
While no succinct method can 
steadfastly be applied to a 
determination of the cause of action 
date, the "exposure approach" 
appears most statutorily consistent, 
and has relatively minor problems. 
While plaintiffs' last exposure to 
asbestos is frequently well before 
the statutory effective year of 1996, 
this may not always be the case as 
older buildings and facilities require 
asbestos abatement to meet 
upcoming renovation and 
rehabilitation needs. 
